Iraq: Why there is no end in site

Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus spent the last few days testifying before Congress on the status of the Iraq war. If there is one thing that is clear, it is that there is no greater strategy other than ongoing force presence. The central message that the two Bush-Administration stand-ins provided, was that troops would be required until they such time as they were no longer be required, but that nobody knew when that would happen or what it would look like.

There was no explanation as to what the administration was trying to achieve or how they were going to achieve it. No overall strategy; just the idea that we'll keep forces in the area until violence somehow works itself out. The real point of the ongoing presence in Iraq appears to be nothing more than to maintain a significant force presence in that area of the world.

There is no indication that anyone in the administration cares one bit about the future of Iraq itself or the Iraqi people. In fact, there’s no indication that the administration actually has any interest in seeing the conflict in Iraq resolved. Quite the contrary, the overriding interest and concern appears to be in drawing the conflict out to justify the ongoing presence of a large number of American troops. Nobody has explained why they think this is necessary or good or helpful. And I can’t see any positive reason for doing this: it is not working as a deterrent to Iran. It’s not deterring anyone from anything.

Senator Hagel asked the right question: "Where’s the surge? Where is the diplomatic surge?" If the administration was really interested in bringing this conflict to a conclusion, there would be some form of diplomatic activity. Some shuttle diplomacy. Some use of the carrot and the stick to get the various competing factions in Iraq to make nice. Something.

What could we do? We can use rebuilding and reconstruction funds as a carrot. We can use the presence of our troops in their peacekeeping capacity as a carrot. Or we can use the withdraw of troops as a carrot. We can use offers to train and educate and feed and clothe as a carrot. Water delivery projects, sewage systems, electrical systems, infrastructure – there are any number of things that we can offer to local sects to encourage them to join in the national government.

We have plenty of sticks to. We can withdraw our troops from a given area. Or we can send more troops into that area. We can cut off funding for reconstruction. We can cut off funding for education, training, for all kinds of assistance. We can encourage a temporary suspension of shares in the national oil income. And we can give all the more to those groups that are cooperating.

And we can work diplomatically to actually bring about a measure of reconciliation. All sides in the conflict feel historically aggrieved. And each side has been aggrieved at some point or another to some extent or another. Part of reconciliation is acknowledging the ways in which each faction has been aggrieved and the ways in which they have been the aggressor. Acknowledging grievances is an important early step in achieving reconciliation.

Now the reality is reconciliation cannot come about, while people are not feeling safe. If our strategy was toward the overarching reconciliation between peoples and the first step in that strategy was creating a sense of safety, where they had not previously been any, and that would make sense. But creating a sense of safety is about more than just guns on the street. It too involves diplomacy – in reducing tensions, in encouraging cooperation, in creating a peace.

All factions in Iraq have suffered through repeated and prolonged periods of trauma (chronic trauma). Given that fact, the way in which Iraq has devolved into chaos and infighting over the past five years is and was entirely predictable.

Judith Herman, the Harvard professor of psychiatry who has done groundbreaking research into traumatic stress, has written: "People who have endured horrible events suffer predictable psychological harm." The ways in which they are going to react, with violence and anger and fear and desperation, are all predictable.

And, as Herman explains: "Because the traumatic syndromes have basic features in common, the recovery process also follows a common pathway. The fundamental stages of recovery are establishing safety, reconstructing the trauma story, and restoring the connection between survivors and their community." A tall order in a war-torn area, but one that can provide a pathway toward actual reconciliation.

Keeping troop levels up, for the sole purpose of combating terrorist cells, does nothing at all to advance the cause of reconciliation and national recovery. The spiral of trauma continues, and there can be no end without a change in strategy. It is that complex, and that simple.